We provide a general framework to study stochastic sequences related to an array of models in different literatures, including models of individual learning in economics, learning automata in computer sciences, social learning in marketing, and many others. In this setup, we study the asymptotic properties of a class of stochastic sequences that take values in [0, 1] and satisfy a property that we call "bounded expected relative hazard rates." We provide sufficient conditions for related sequences, which, compared to the original sequence, either move slowly or slow down over time, that yield convergence to one with high probability or almost surely, respectively. We apply these results to show the optimality of the learning models in
Introduction
Stochastic sequences that arise in many models from different disciplines exhibit expected hazard rates that are proportional to the sequence's current value. Analyses of these models are usually concerned with whether these sequences converge towards a certain upper bound. For instance, models of technology adoption often satisfy that the change in the fraction of a population that adopts a new technology is proportional to the product of the current fraction of adopters and the current fraction of non-adopters (see, e.g., Young (2009) ). This feature, namely, that the hazard rate of adoption is proportional to the current fraction of adopters, is typically motivated by the assumption that diffusion of technology requires non-adopters to observe adopters in order to learn about the new technology. Several models of individual learning, imitation, and epidemics, among others, share this property. 1 Furthermore, if this proportionality is constant and the path of the fraction of adopters is deterministic, convergence to full adoption is guaranteed. In contrast, when the adoption path is stochastic, a number of things might happen that would cause full adoption to fail. For instance, the new technology may be completely abandoned at some point in time, or the adoption may lose strength. This paper is concerned with the general issue of providing sufficient conditions for stochastic sequences taking values in [0, 1] , that exhibit submartingality and expected hazard rates that are proportional to the current value of the sequence for them to converge to one.
Our convergence results are cast within a framework that encompasses several setups that appear in the literature. In particular, we consider states of the world that correspond to an infinite sequence of one-period choices of Nature whose realization is revealed in each period. These realizations determine the dynamics of the variables we focus on. We are interested in a convex subset of real vectors that we call the configuration space and whose elements are called configurations. These vectors play a role analogous to the probabilities of choosing each action in standard models of individual learning (see, e.g., Erev and Roth (1998) ), or to the fractions of the population that choose each action in social learning models (see, e.g., Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) ). We focus on the performance of the updating process in each configuration. In general, performance may be measured through a linear function defined on the configuration space. We call this function the aggregator, and it maps each configuration to a real number in the unit interval that may be interpreted as a measure of the performance of the process when such a configuration is reached, and that we refer to as the performance measure. Such an aggregator function can be very simple. It may correspond to the sum of the probabilities of choosing an optimal action in a model of individual learning or the fraction of the population that chooses an optimal action in population models. We also consider a different variable, called the state of information, that summarizes the relevant information that has been revealed up to each period. The aggregator function does not depend directly on the state of information, however, as performance is assumed to be completely determined by the configuration. It thus follows that the way the configuration changes in response to the information that becomes available plays a critical role in whether an updating rule yields an increase of the performance measure over time. The function that determines how the configuration changes is the updating rule. This function maps the current configuration, the state of information, and the new information that becomes available to an updated configuration. A pair of an updating rule and an aggregator is referred to as a system. The properties of the system play a critical role in our analysis, because they determine the performance dynamics.
We focus on systems such that the performance measure satisfies a property that we call (weakly) bounded expected relative hazard rates, or (W)BERHR. This property imposes the expected ratio of the hazard rate of the performance measure to the performance measure to be non-negative. 2 As we shall see below, several models of learning in economics, as well as various models from several disciplines, including biology, computer science, marketing, and psychology, among others, satisfy this property. This property has the intuitive interpretation suggested above in models of technology diffusion, where new adopters turn to a new technology when they sample current adopters. Most of such models are deterministic, and hence, it is unavoidable that full adoption occurs. In contrast, the models considered in this paper are stochastic, and we provide sufficient conditions to rule out nonconvergence to full adoption. This enables us to obtain convergence results for this class of models in setups that allow for stochastic dynamics.
Our first result, Theorem 1, analyzes the asymptotical properties of a sequence that can be obtained as a slow version of a sequence that satisfies WBERHR or BERHR, i.e., sequences such that configurations change less in response to the information revealed in each period. We show that the probability of achieving optimality, i.e., the probability that the performance measure converges to one, can be made arbitrarily high by considering a sequence that is slow enough. This result considerably generalizes a previous result by Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) in the literature of machine learning for simple learning automata. It also allows us to obtain novel convergence results in different contexts, including, for instance, the models of social learning that we discuss below. Theorem 1, however, has two important limitations. First, optimality, although likely, is not guaranteed. Second, for each certainty level of achieving convergence to one, the degree of slowness needed is usually determined by the probability measure of the underlying probability space, which, in applications, is typically assumed to be unknown.
Both these problems are tackled by our second and third results.
Some sequences are primitively defined in such a manner that they can be interpreted as a slow version of the performance measure of some system. This allows us to analyze the asymptotic properties of these sequences without looking at their underlying system. We follow this approach in Theorem 2. In this result, we consider an extra condition that may be interpreted as requiring arbitrary slowing down over time. This yields sufficient conditions for achieving optimality almost surely. Although we provide conditions for optimality in a general abstract setup, encompassing a wide array of settings studied in the literature, the conditions that lead to convergence are not at odds with some typically presumed features of the systems in certain applications. In particular, our condition of arbitrary slowing down over time is consistent with the "power law of practice" in models of individual learning (see, e.g., Erev and Roth (1998) and the references therein).
Our third general result, Corollary 1, provides sufficient conditions for the slow version of a system that satisfies BERHR to yield optimality almost surely. These conditions require the system to slow down linearly, i.e., the expected change in the configuration, in response to the new information, has to decrease linearly over time. 3 Next we turn our attention to applications. In the first application, we consider several models of individual learning with both partial and full information. Within the class of models with partial information, we consider a generalized version of the class of monotone learning rules in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) that extends their analysis to a dynamic setting. In this setup, the space of configurations corresponds to the set of vectors containing the probabilities of choosing each action, and the aggregator corresponds to the sum of the probabilities of choosing the expected payoff maximizing actions. It is readily verified that this class of learning models satisfies WBERHR. Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) show that this class of learning rules, in expected value, increases the probability of choosing expected payoff maximizing actions in the short run, i.e., in each period. Our results significantly strengthen their findings. By adding linear slowing down, using Corollary 1, we obtain that these learning models converge almost surely to the set of payoff maximizing actions. We provide a similar construction in a setting where individuals receive full information, i.e., observe both obtained and forgone payoffs.
In a second application, we show that Theorem 2 can be used to obtain an alternative proof of the well-known result that the learning model of Roth and Erev (1995) converges to payoff maximization.
In contrast to previous arguments appearing in the literature (e.g., Rustichini (1999) , Beggs (2005) , Hopkins and Posch (2005) ), our argument builds on the properties of the expected relative hazard rates of this model. 4 Hence, our results provide a different interpretation of the convergence property of this model.
In a third application, we look at models of word-of-mouth social learning. Schlag (1998) characterizes a set of imitation rules that allows the average payoff of the population, in expected value, to increase in every single period when each individual observes her own and other individual's choices and payoffs.
These rules are called improving rules. He also shows that for populations with a continuum of individuals, the fraction of the population that chooses the optimal action converges to one. For finite populations, however, little is known about the probability of convergence to the payoff maximizing actions. Whereas 3 More precisely, the lower bound of the expected value of (Pt+1 − Pt)/((1 − Pt)Pt) of the slow version is 1 t+2 times the lower bound in the original sequence.
4 Some of the previous studies that have analyzed the asymptotic properties of the Roth-Erev learning model have applied incorrectly results of the theory of stochastic approximations (a remarkable exception is Beggs (2005) , whose study of the properties of this model in decision problems is based on the asymptotic properties of the "attractions"). Hopkins and Posch (2005) , however, show that the results in those studies are, nevertheless, correct.
continuum populations provide a useful benchmark for analyzing choice dynamics in the context of social learning, finite populations are important as well. Most of the time, the subject of analysis in economics involves only a finite number of individuals. It would be somewhat discouraging if the positive longrun results we know for continuum populations have no counterparts for finite populations. We provide sufficient conditions for the probability that finite populations converge to choose the optimal actions almost surely. These conditions require, first, introducing an inertial behavior component, and second, imposing that changes in the probabilities of choosing each action by each individual decrease linearly over time. Put together, these conditions, along with the improving properties previously studied in the literature, guarantee that the population eventually converges to choose the optimal action.
Related literature. Our convergence results for sequences that change arbitrarily slow over time are related to findings in the literature of learning in games. In particular, it is well known that in learning models where the probabilities of choosing each action are based on assessments of their performance, linear slowing down in assessments' adjustment yields long-run behavior that corresponds to continuoustime deterministic dynamics (see, e.g., Ch. 4 and 5 in Fudenberg and Levine (1998) ). It is also known that continuous time limits describe behavior of discrete time models over a finite number of periods (see, e.g., Börgers and Sarin (1997) ). Yet, this literature offers no results about the probability of achieving optimality for models such as those in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004), or Schlag (1998) , despite their robust submartingality with arbitrary payoff distributions. Our results provide a unifying approach for analyzing this issue and filling this gap. Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) analyze a learning automaton that repeatedly chooses between two actions where only two possible outcomes, failure or success, are possible. They show that a learning automaton that satisfies a slightly stronger version of our BERHR condition converges with high probability to choose the action that is more likely to yield success, provided that changes in the probability of choosing each action are small. Several authors use the results of Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) in the learning automata literature (see, e.g., Torkestani and Meybodi (2009) ). Oyarzun and Sarin (2012) adapt the techniques in Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) to provide convergence of a class of learning models to risk averse choice. Their configuration space corresponds to a vector of probabilities of choosing each action. These probabilities are a function of a "state of learning" that follows a first-order Markov process. The settings in these papers are less general than ours, and their results are implied by our Theorem 1. None of these papers has a counterpart to our almost-sure convergence results, Theorem 2
and Corollary 1, as the models they analyze fail to satisfy our arbitrary slowing-down conditions. The paper that is closest to what we here study is that of Lamberton, Pages, and Tarres (2004) , who analyze the asymptotical properties of the Bush and Mosteller (1951) model of learning with a varying gain parameter. They provide conditions that yield optimality almost surely. Their analysis is tailored to the specific characteristics of the Bush and Mosteller (1951) model, however, whereas the generality of our framework allows us to apply our results in different settings.
The model
In this section, we provide the analytical framework of our analysis, introduce the concept of bounded expected relative hazard rates, and show that this condition, in general, is not sufficient to yield optimality almost surely.
General framework
States of the world. All possible states of the world are represented by the measurable product space
where Ω t stands for the set of states that may occur at time t ∈ N and is equipped with a σ-algebra F t describing the set of events. Furthermore, let F [0,t] := ⊗ t τ =1 F τ denote the set of all events that may occur up to time t ∈ N and F [0,0] := {∅, Ω}.
Information space. The set of all information that ever may be available is denoted by F. We call an element f ∈ F a state of information. There is no need to specify these states for the results in this section; however we assume that there exists a sequence {F t } t∈N 0 of nonempty subsets of F representing the possible information revealed up to any point in time.
Configuration space. We consider a convex subset S of R D , where D ∈ N. An element σ ∈ S in the configuration space determines the state of the process, that we shall distinguish from the state of the world, described by the set Ω.
Aggregator. Each configuration σ ∈ S is mapped to a measure of optimality through a linear function denoted by A : S → [0, 1]. We refer to this function as the aggregator and to A (σ) as the performance measure of the configuration σ.
Updating rule. The central point of our analysis is an updating rule described by a sequence
of functions Π F t : Ω t × F t−1 ×S → F t describes how the state of information is updated. We shall usually omit the first argument of Π t and Π F t , for sake of notation.
System. We call a pair of an updating rule and an aggregator, (Π, A), a system. Probability. We fix a probability measure P, defined on (Ω, F), and we denote by E t [·] its conditional expectation operator and by P t the conditional probability measure, given F [0,t] , for all t ∈ N.
We thus study a model that evolves in discrete time. At any point in time, the system updates the configuration in a probabilistic way, according to the information that becomes available, depending on the state of the world. Then, the aggregator maps the new configuration to its performance measure.
The individual and social learning models that we consider in the applications' section correspond to particular examples of this framework. In these models the states that occur at each time t ∈ N determine the actions chosen by the individuals, the obtained and forgone payoffs, and the information revealed to each individual. The probability measure shall have two components; the first one determines the distribution of a technical randomization device that is used to model the probabilistic choices of individuals, whereas the second one describes the environment in which individuals live. The state of information typically corresponds to a function of the information, up to time t ∈ N, that has been revealed to each individual, with a suitable updating rule. The configuration space typically is a set of vector tuples in the simplex of actions the individuals make choices from. These vector tuples correspond to the probability of choosing each action for each individual. The aggregator maps those vectors to the probability of choosing an optimal action, in models of individual learning, and to an average probability of choosing optimal actions, in models of social learning. The updating rule is the key ingredient of the model and it is determined by a function that maps each individual's observed part of the state of the world, previous information, and the current probability of choosing each action to an updated probability of choosing each action.
The distinction between configurations and states of information allows us to isolate what determines the performance of the system from potentially richer descriptions of the information accumulated by the system. The example of the Roth-Erev model of individual learning analyzed below makes this distinction clear. In that model, the configuration is the vector of probabilities of choosing each action, whereas the state of information correspond to the vector of "attractions" of each action.
Bounded expected relative hazard rates
In order to get an intuitive idea of the class of sequences that we analyze in this paper, it is useful to consider a bit more formally the interpretation borrowed from the literature on adoption of technology (see, e.g., Young (2009) ), which we mentioned in the introduction. Let P t ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of a continuum population that has adopted a new technology by time t ∈ N 0 . In models of technology adoption, the change in the fraction of the population that adopts the new technology is given by the rate at which adoption occurs when a non-adopter at time t observes an adopter. If only one other individual is observed and the probability of observing other individuals in the population is uniform, the fraction of time t non-adopters who observe time t adopters is P t (1 − P t ). Only some of them are assumed to adopt the new technology in t + 1. In the spirit of survival theory, we call this fraction of (net) new adopters, namely (P t+1 − P t ) / (P t (1 − P t )), the relative hazard rate of P := {P t } t∈N 0 . 5 The relative hazard rates of several models that we analyze below are random. The objective of this paper is providing conditions on the expected value of the relative hazard rates for P to converge to one. Some of our applications involve models of individual learning where this interpretation does not directly apply. We shall see, however, that such models generate behavior that is related to the dynamics of the models of technology adoption we mentioned above. We allow the relative hazard rates to be stochastic, and we shall focus on sequences whose expected relative hazard rates are bounded from below. Definition 1. We say that a system (Π, A) satisfies the weakly bounded expected relative hazard rates property (WBERHR) with lower bound sequence δ := {δ t } t∈N 0 , where
for all f ∈ F t , σ ∈ S, and t ∈ N 0 . We say that (Π, A) satisfies the bounded expected relative hazard rates property (BERHR) if it satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ := {δ t } t∈N 0 such that
We consider a random sequence P := {P t } t∈N 0 with
) for all t ∈ N, and f 0 ∈ F 0 and σ 0 ∈ S exogenously given. If (Π, A) satisfies BERHR or WBERHR, then P is a bounded submartingale and hence, there exists a random variable P ∞ , such that lim t↑∞ P t = P ∞ almost surely. Our analysis is mainly concerned with optimality, i.e., the event {P ∞ = 1}, and the properties of a system that yield this event to occur with high probability.
2.3 Examples for the lack of almost sure optimality BERHR does not guarantee almost-sure convergence of P to one; that is, usually P(P ∞ = 1) > 0. Yet, as Lemma 6 in Appendix A reveals, if (Π, A) satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 , such that ∞ t=0 δ t = ∞ almost surely, then P ∞ ∈ {0, 1} for all f 0 ∈ F 0 and σ 0 ∈ S. To provide a first simple example for the lack of almost-sure convergence, consider S = [0, 1], F = {0}, the updating rule Π defined by the sequence of random variables Π t (0, σ) taking values 0 and 1 with probability (1 − σ)/2 and (1 + σ)/2 for all σ > 0, and Π t (0, 0) = 0; and the aggregator A defined by A(σ) = σ. 7 It is clear that (Π, A) satisfies BERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 given by 5 The term "relative hazard rate" has been coined by Young (2009) , who analyzes the empirical relevance of alternative models of social learning regarding their predictions for the dynamics of the relative hazard rates over time. 6 We emphasize that the BERHR property does not require that inf t∈N 0 {δt} is uniformly (in ω ∈ Ω) bounded away from zero. 7 In order to fully describe the system we need to specify the set of states of the world. Here, for example, one could set Ωt = [0, 1] and define the probability measure P as the product measure of uniform measures on Ωt. Then, the full specification of the updating rule is Πt(ω, 0, σ) = 1 {ω≤(1+σ)/2} for all σ > 0 and Πt(ω, 0, 0) = 0.
δ t = 1/2 for all t ∈ N 0 and that P ∞ = P 1 , which is zero with probability (1 − σ 0 )/2. Thus, we have optimality only with probability (1 + σ 0 )/2.
The last example is degenerate in the sense that the system does not move after time t = 1, when P gets absorbed at either zero or one. As we illustrate now, by adapting an example in Viswanathan and Narendra (1972) , even systems
• that satisfy a strong version of BERHR, so that the lower bound sequence is uniformly (in ω ∈ Ω) bounded away from zero, and
• that have a performance sequence P that never gets absorbed, to wit, P t ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ N 0 , may not satisfy optimality almost surely. Towards this end, we set
for all t ∈ N, ω = (ω 1 , ω 2 , ω 3 ) ∈ Ω t , and σ ∈ S and some exogenously given constant β ∈ (0, 1).
We fix µ 1 , µ 2 ∈ (0, 1) with µ 1 < µ 2 and assume that the underlying probability measure P is the product measure of the measures P t , defined on (Ω t , F t ), which are distributed as a Bernoulli random variable in the first component with parameter µ 1 , as a Bernoulli random variable in the second component with parameter µ 2 , and uniformly distributed in the third component, such that the three components are independent; to wit,
This system describes a learning automaton that, at each time t, chooses one out of two actions and observes the realization of a failure or success, encoded by ω 1 and ω 2 . The first action succeeds with probability µ 1 , the second one with probability µ 2 . The probability of choosing the first action is 1 − σ, the probability of choosing the second action is σ. If the observed realization is a failure, the configuration σ is unchanged. If the first action is chosen and a success is observed, then the configuration σ is decreased by (1 − β)σ. Analogously, if the second action is chosen and a success is observed, then the configuration σ is increased by (1 − β)(1 − σ). Thus, observed successes increase the probability of observing the same action in the next period.
It is straightforward to verify that this system verifies BERHR with constant lower bound (1− β)(µ 2 − µ 1 ) > 0. Nevertheless, it can be shown that, with strictly positive probability, each action is chosen at all times and therefore the event {P ∞ = 0} has positive probability. For the exposition of the argument, it is useful to partition the time in "blocks," i.e., finite number of consecutive time periods. Then, the probability of, starting at t = 1, choosing action 1 in a row, at all times, in blocks of one time, two times, ..., N times, without choosing action 2 between blocks, and with at least one success in each block is bounded from below by
This follows from two facts. First, the probability of obtaining at least one success in a block of length j,
given that action 1 is chosen always in that block, is 1 − (1 − µ 1 ) j , for all j ∈ N. Second, the probability of choosing action 1 at all times in a block of length j, after choosing action 1 in a row, at all times starting at t = 1, in blocks of one time, two times, ..., j − 1 times, without choosing action 2 between blocks, and with at least one success in each block, is at least (1 − β j−1 σ 0 ) j , for all j ∈ N.
We now argue that the limit of the expression in (3), as N tends to ∞, is strictly positive, which,
for all large enough j imply that the first product in (3) converges to a strictly positive number since ∞ j=1 jβ j−1 < ∞ by the ratio test. Intuitively, when an action is chosen initially and sufficient successes are observed, there is a positive probability that this action is always chosen. As we shall see in the next section, systems where the adjustment of the configuration is slowed down rule out this possibility and guarantee that P converges to one almost surely.
Convergence results for slow versions
In this section, we analyze the asymptotic properties of the performance measure of systems that satisfy either BERHR or WBERHR. In particular, we provide sufficient conditions for slow versions of these systems, in a sense that we make precise below, to yield optimality almost surely. As we now explain, the argument works with a gradual slowing down of the changes in the configuration prescribed by the updating rule.
In order to introduce slow versions of the systems, we first introduce the concept of a slowing sequence, i.e., a sequence θ := {θ t } t∈N 0 such that θ t ∈ (0, 1] is F [0,t] -measurable. For a given slowing sequence θ and updating rule Π, we define a new updating rule, denoted by Π θ = Π θ t t∈N , as a sequence of functions
for all σ ∈ S and t ∈ N. We say that the updating rule Π θ is a slow version of Π and that the system (Π θ , A) is a slow version of (Π, A).
8 We use that, for aj < 1,
(1 − aj) converges to a strictly positive number if ∞ j=1 aj converges absolutely, which follows from taking logarithms and the limit comparison test.
Let P θ = P θ t t∈N 0 be defined analogously to P = {P t } t∈N 0 using the same updating rule Π F for the state of information. To wit, P θ
) for all t ∈ N, and f θ 0 = f 0 ∈ F 0 and σ θ 0 = σ 0 ∈ S are exogenously given. If (Π, A) satisfies WBERHR, so does Π θ , A (for details, see Lemma 5 in Appendix A). Furthermore, if (Π, A) satisfies BERHR and inf t∈N 0 {θ t } > 0, Π θ , A satisfies BERHR as well. Hence, as before, we can define P θ ∞ := lim t↑∞ P θ t for Π θ , A . We shall say that P θ is a slow version of P .
Before turning to the results, we shall remark that the definitions of slow versions of updating rules and systems suggest a further motivation for the interpretation that we give to states of information and configurations along the paper. Whereas configurations change less in the slow versions of an updating rule, the states of information are updated just as in the original model. In other words, the slow versions and original systems differ in how these systems respond to new information, and hence in their performance measure, but not on how information is updated.
Building on an argument by Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) , we obtain the following result: Theorem 1. Suppose the system (Π, A) satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 ,
, where c is a constant depending only on σ 0 and ǫ, satisfies P(
Intuitively, the first assertion of this theorem allows us to provide an arbitrarily high lower bound for the probability of yielding optimality by making the changes of the configuration small enough for each arrival of new information. The second assertion establishes that further slowing down cannot make achieving optimality less likely than the mentioned lower bound. Since BERHR implies WBERHR, this holds for systems that satisfy BERHR, as well.
The first part of the argument relies on the fact that if (Π, A) satisfies WBERHR and δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 is non-square-summable, then P ∞ ∈ {0, 1} and P θ ∞ ∈ {0, 1}. Non-square-summability plays a role analogous to that of the non-shrinking condition in Oyarzun and Sarin (2012) , yet it is much less restrictive. The rest of the proof of Theorem 1 follows the ideas in Lakshmivarahan and Thathachar (1976) . Since our result, however, is more precise and holds in more general settings, our argument needs to be considerably more elaborated. We provide an informal discussion here and the full proof in Appendix A.
The proof of Theorem 1 is based on the idea of applying an increasing, concave function φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with φ(0) = 0 and φ(1) = 1 to the submartingale P such that φ(P 0 ) > 1 − ǫ. The new sequence {φ(P t )} t∈N 0 , in general, is not a submartingale. However, WBERHR yields a positive lower bound on the expected differences P t+1 − P t and φ is locally approximately linear. Applying φ then, to the slow version P θ , which, in each step, only moves in a small neighborhood, corresponds to applying an almost linear function to a submartingale with a positive lower bound on its expected growth. Putting these ideas together and making them rigorous then yields that φ(P θ t ) t∈N 0 is indeed a submartingale. Given that P θ ∞ ∈ {0, 1}, one then obtains the statement, that is, P(P θ ∞ = 1) > 1 − ǫ. The main ideas of this discussion are contained in the proof of Lemma 7. Therein, however, instead of constructing a new submartingale {φ(P t )} t∈N 0 , we are constructing the components of a supermartingale, using the same ideas, as this approach simplifies the technical arguments for Theorem 1 and the assertions below.
Taking a different point of view, slow updating leads to a higher probability of converging to one due to the lack of additivity of standard deviation. In slow updating, one updating step is replaced by several updating steps. While the increase in expectation is additive, the standard deviations of the corresponding steps add up only subadditively; thus the relation of increase in expectation and corresponding standard deviation changes; and, therefore, raises the probability of converging to one.
The results provided so far consider a system and slowing sequences that can turn this system into a slow version that is likely to yield optimality. Some systems are primitively defined in such a manner that they can be interpreted as slow versions of others systems with no need of introducing a slowing sequence.
This allows us to analyze the asymptotic properties of P = {P t } t∈N 0 without looking at the underlying system. Our next result follows this idea yielding a sufficient condition for P to converge to one almost surely:
Theorem 2. Consider an {F [0,t] } t∈N 0 -adapted stochastic process P = {P t } t∈N 0 with P t ∈ [0, 1] and P 0 > 0 satisfying 1. "Non-summable relative hazard rates:" The sequence P satisfies
for some F [0,t] -measurable random variable δ t > 0, for all t ∈ N 0 , with
2. "Slow version with strictly positive relative hazard rates:" There exist a strictly positive random variableδ > 0 and a sequence θ = {θ t } t∈N 0 of almost surely decreasing
3. "Arbitrary slowing down over time:" The stopping time ρ, defined as
is almost surely finite for all y ∈ R.
Then, lim t↑∞ P t = 1.
This result requires, first, that P satisfies a non-summable version of WBERHR in which the system is not explicitly specified. Second, it requires that P can be interpreted as a slow version, with a slowing sequence θ, of a fictitious sequence that we do not explicitly define, but whose changes in each period are given by (P t+1 − P t )/θ t . This fictitious sequence also satisfies (5) with δ t replaced byδ, for somẽ δ > 0. Finally, we require that the fictitious slowing down sequence θ eventually gets arbitrarily small compared to the sequence P . The first two conditions, "Non-summable relative hazard rates" and "Slow version with strictly positive hazard rates," seem natural given our previous analysis since they provide an interpretation of P as a slow version of the performance measure of a system that satisfies WBERHR.
The third condition, "Arbitrary slowing down over time," may seem more restrictive. However, as we shall illustrate below, in Subsection 4.1.3, some models such as the Roth-Erev learning model satisfy all these properties. We thus provide an argument different from those appearing in the literature to prove the optimality of this model.
We remark that the condition in (5) is weaker than the WBERHR condition, as the later has to hold for all configurations σ ∈ S. We can avoid this stronger assumption as here we do not construct a new sequence P θ but only interpret P, step by step, as a slowed down version of some other fictitious sequence.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar to the one of Theorem 1 and can be found in Appendix A. In the setup of the informal discussion of the proof of Theorem 1 above, we now slow down a fictitious sequence more and more, which allows us to increase the concavity (and thus the value of φ(P t )) in each step, without loosing the submartingale property of the process {φ(P t )} t∈N 0 . We slow down this fictitious sequence until the submartingale is greater than 1 − ǫ, for a given but arbitrary ǫ. That this happens almost surely in finite time is guaranteed by the assumption of arbitrarily slowing down over time. From this point on, the proof then follows the one in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1 is limited in the sense that it does not provide sufficient conditions for optimality almost surely. More importantly, we need to know the probability measure P or, more precisely, the sequence δ to pin down the slowing sequence θ that guarantees any given confidence level of achieving optimality.
However, P typically is assumed to be unknown in applications. These problems are taken care of by Corollary 1, where we consider a reciprocally linearly decreasing slowing sequence:
Corollary 1. Suppose the system (Π, A) satisfies BERHR and A (σ 0 ) > 0. Then the slowing sequence θ = {θ t } t∈N 0 , defined by θ t = 1/(t + 2), satisfies P(P θ ∞ = 1) = 1.
Proof. For the sequence P θ of the statement, we check that the assumptions of Theorem 2 are satisfied.
First of all, by Lemma 5 in Appendix A and the fact that ∞ t=0 θ t = ∞ almost surely, we obtain that P θ satisfies the non-summable relative hazard rates property. The slow version property is obvious by the definition of P θ . Finally, Lemma 9 in Appendix A yields the arbitrary slowing down property of P θ .
Recall that in the example by Viswanathan and Narendra (1972) in Subsection 2.3, optimality may not occur because the probability of choosing one action once, then twice,..., then N times in a row with at least one success in each block does not go to zero when N tends to ∞. This implies that the probability of choosing only one action (any of them) all times is strictly positive. Corollary 1 reveals that this would not be the case if we replace 1 − β by (1 − β)/(t + 1) in the underlying updating function given in (2). The slowed speed of adjustment of the configuration prevents the automaton of choosing always the suboptimal action with strictly positive probability. Similarly, as Theorem 1 reveals, that probability could be made arbitrarily small if one replaces 1 − β by θ(1 − β) for some sufficiently small constant θ > 0.
Applications to learning
In this section, we apply the asymptotic results of the last section within a framework that nests several models of individual and social learning.
Notation. We consider a finite set W of individuals that we call the population. These individuals choose actions in some finite set A that yield some payoff in a bounded set X := [x min , x max ], with −∞ < x min < x max < ∞. Formally, if individual i ∈ W chooses action a ∈ A := {1, ..., N } at time t ∈ N, she obtains a payoff, denoted by x t . Individual i may only observe the payoff she obtained or she may observe both the obtained and forgone payoffs, i.e., the whole profile {x (i) t (a)} a∈A . In these cases it is said that the individual has partial information or full information, respectively. We will consider these two possibilities below when we analyze models of individual learning.
Since we also consider applications to social learning, we may allow individuals to observe the chosen action(s) and obtained payoff(s) of other individual(s) in the population as well. The set of individuals that i ∈ W observes at time t ∈ N (including her self) is called the sample and it is denoted by s
The profile of actions chosen by the individuals in a sample s at time t ∈ N is denoted by a (s) t for all (non-empty) s ∈ P(W ), where P(W ) denotes the set of all subsets of W , and the corresponding profile of payoffs is denoted by x (s) information available to individual i at time t, and its specification varies across the different learning models we consider.
General framework. We now specify the general framework introduced in Subsection 2.1 for the learning setup.
• Within this setup, the set of states that may occur at time t ∈ N, corresponds to the set Ω t = t (a)} i∈W,a∈A , and observed samples, {s
We denote the corresponding Borel σ-algebra by F t .
• The set of states of information at time t ∈ N 0 , F t , corresponds to possible past information (or some of its summary statistics) that an individual might have obtained. For example, in the RothErev learning model, which we discuss in Subsection 4.1.3, a state of information is the vector of "attractions" the individual uses to determine the probability of choosing each action.
• The configuration, σ, corresponds to the probability of choosing each action in models of individual learning. In models of social learning, σ corresponds to a profile of vectors of probabilities (σ (i) (a)) i∈W,a∈A ; here σ (i) (a) represents the probability of choosing action a by individual i. Thus, in either case, S = (∆(A)) |W | , with |W | = 1 in models of individual learning.
• In order to introduce the aggregator, we first fix, for each i ∈ W , a set A * i ⊂ A of optimal actions. For instance, A * i may be the set of expected payoff maximizing actions of i. This set is determined by the environment, i.e., the underlying probability distribution P, which we shall discuss below.
The aggregator function is then defined as A : S → [0, 1], with
for all σ ∈ S.
• The updating rule at time t ∈ N, Π t , in the models of individual learning corresponds to the behavioral rule L
(1) t and, in the models of imitation, it is determined by the profile of behavioral rules {L (i) t } i∈W . The information updating rule at time t ∈ N, Π F t , is defined specifically in each setup.
• It remains to specify the probability distribution P over (Ω, F). First of all, we rewrite Ω as the product space of two spaces Ω R and Ω E (along with the corresponding σ-algebras); more precisely, we write
with Ω R t := [0, 1] |W | , Ω E t := X |A| × P(W ) |W | , and Ω t = Ω R t × Ω E t for all t ∈ N. We will always assume that P is the product measure of two probability measures; to wit, P = P R × P E , with P R and P E defined over the respective spaces. In particular, the two components corresponding to each state of the world, are independent.
-The first component of P, P R , provides a technical randomization device 10 that links the updating rule to the probabilistic interpretation of a configuration. To be precise, P R is a product measure (corresponding to different times) of product measures (corresponding to different individuals) of |W | uniformly distributed random variables over [0, 1] . Each σ ∈ S can be interpreted as a matrix of parameters of a family of |W | independent multinomial distributions over the set of actions A. Each individual i partitions the interval [0, 1] in |A| intervals whose measures are the elements of σ (i) = σ (i) (a) a∈A . Then, the realization of the randomization device determines that action a is chosen if that realization is contained in the interval corresponding to that action. Formally, ω ∈ Ω t (or more precisely, the components of ω in Ω R t ) and σ ∈ S determine the profile of choices {a
-The second component of P, P E , specifies the environment in which individuals live, such as the distribution of the payoffs. It satisfies different assumptions that differ among the different setups that we discuss below. Individuals are not assumed to know P E . In particular, they do not know the distribution over the payoff profile. We denote by x (s)
t (a (s) , ω) the profile of payoffs obtained at time t ∈ N by a sample of individuals s if they choose the actions a (s) and the state of the world at t is ω ∈ Ω t .
Individual learning
In this subsection, we focus on individual learning, thus, |W | = 1. At each time t ∈ N, the individual observes the payoff she would have obtained from any action if she had chosen such an action or some part of this information. The behavioral rule, denoted by L t , 11 is a function mapping the current probabilities of choosing each action at time t ∈ N, past information available to the individual, and the observed part of the vector of actions and corresponding payoffs, to the probability of choosing each action at time t + 1. 10 The use of randomization devices is standard and well understood. We introduce this explicitly here to make sure our notation in the sequel is transparent.
11 For the analysis of individual learning we omit the superscript (i).
Two cases that we consider below are partial information, i.e., where the individual only observes the payoff of the action she chose; and full information, i.e., where the individual observes the payoff that she would have obtained with each action. As a third example, we study the Roth-Erev learning model within our setup.
Partial information
First, we consider a model of individual learning with partial information where the individual only observes the payoff she obtained from the action she chose at each time t ∈ N. We thus assume that
, and t ∈ N, where (a t (ω, σ), x t (a t (ω, σ), ω)) ∈ A × X correspond to the chosen action and obtained payoff. The action the individual chooses is determined by the randomization device described above. 12 The behavioral rule here is specified as
for all t ∈ N. We then have that
for all t ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω t , f ∈ F t−1 and σ ∈ S. We need not make any further assumptions on P E , the probability measure that specifies the environment.
In this application, we consider a class of behavioral rules called monotone learning rules. They are defined as those that lead to an increase in the expected conditional probability of choosing an expected payoff maximizing action. These rules have been characterized in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) , who consider a one-period model and specify behavioral rules "locally," i.e., for a fixed configuration σ in the interior of ∆(A). We extend their setup in the natural way and observe that their characterization yields that a learning rule L := {L t } t∈N is monotone if and only if there exist sequences of functions
where the coefficients A b,a,t (f, σ) and B b,a,t (f, σ) satisfy
We emphasize again that we do not strive for the most general formulation. One might, for example, consider information sets that contain the payoffs of unobserved actions, their average value, or more general, ft could be a random variable that is measurable with respect to F [0,t] . The analysis of this section then would work out in the same manner.
for all t ∈ N, f ∈ F t−1 , σ ∈ ∆(A), a ∈ A, b ∈ A \ {a}, and x ∈ X ; and there exist b ∈ C and a ∈ A \ C, such that B b,a,t (f, σ) > 0 for all non-empty strict subsets C of A.
We now provide bounds for the relative hazard rates of the probability of choosing optimal actions.
As Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) show,
for all a ∈ A and t ∈ N 0 . It follows that the updating rule determined by this class of behavioral rules and the aggregator function defined with the expected payoff maximization criterion define a system that satisfies the WBERHR condition:
Lemma 1. Let
Then, the system (Π, A), defined by (7), (8), (9), and (10) satisfies WBERHR, with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 , where
The proof of the last lemma, which follows from (11), is trivial, and thus, is omitted. In the specific class of monotone learning rules, Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 therefore yield the following corollary. Recall that P = {A(σ t )} t∈N 0 denotes the performance measure.
Corollary 2. With the notation and assumptions of Lemma 1 the following holds:
1. Suppose that ∞ t=0 δ 2 t = ∞ and P 0 > 0. Then, for all ǫ > 0, there exists a slowing sequence θ = {θ t } t∈N 0 such that P(P θ ∞ = 1) > 1 − ǫ. Here P θ corresponds to the system (Π θ , A), with parameters A θ b,a,t (f, σ) :
, and t ∈ N in (9) and (10).
Suppose that
and, for sake of simple notation, assume that X = [0, 1]. Then, for any c ∈ (0, 1], the behavioral rule with A b,a,t (f, σ) = (1 − c)/(t + 1) and B b,a,t (f, σ) = c/(t + 1) in (9) and (10) for all a, b ∈ A, f ∈ F t−1 , σ ∈ ∆(A), and t ∈ N, satisfies P(P ∞ = 1) = 1.
We remark that the analysis does not require stationarity or independence of the actions' payoffs. As long as A * = ∅, we obtain, for example, optimality almost surely with the rule of the second part of the last corollary. Thus, the corresponding behavioral rule is robust, not only over the short run, as shown in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) , but also over the long-run. The individual does not need to know the payoff distributions, but can be certain to choose an expected payoff maximizing action in the long-run, as long as her behavior is determined by a behavioral rule that gets arbitrarily slow over time.
Full information
Now we consider a model of individual learning with full information. Each time the individual observes the payoff she obtained and forgone payoffs. We thus assume that F 0 is an arbitrary singleton, F t = F t−1 × X |A| , and Π
In this setup, a construction with similar dynamics to those in Börgers, Morales, and Sarin (2004) can be provided in terms of a class of functions that we have used to describe imitation models in our previous work Oyarzun and Ruf (2009) . In the full information setting, the behavioral rule is a function mapping the current information state, probabilities of choosing each action, and obtained and forgone payoffs to the probability of choosing each action in the next period. Thus, the behavioral rule here is specified as
for all t ∈ N. We then have
for all t ∈ N, f ∈ F t−1 , ω ∈ Ω t and σ ∈ S.
We interpret the class of behavioral rules that we analyze here as if the individual was making pairwise comparisons between all possible pairs of actions and moving probability from one action to the other. We start by specifying a class of functions that are useful to construct such behavioral rules. These functions describe how probabilities are switched from one action to the other in each pair-wise comparison. These functions are anti-symmetric; in particular, no probability is swapped when the individual is comparing two actions that yielded the same payoff. Furthermore, when the payoff of one action is greater than the payoff of another action, probability is moved toward the action that yielded the higher payoff in the corresponding pairwise comparison.
Definition 2. We say that a function g :
2. g(x 1 , ·) is non-decreasing for all x 1 ∈ X , and 3. g(x 1 , x 2 ) ≥ 0 for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X with x 2 > x 1 .
An example of symmetric-switch functions that play an important role in our analysis are functions of the type g(x 1 , x 2 ) = b(x 2 − x 1 ) for some sufficiently small scalar b ≥ 0.
Using symmetric-switch functions, we construct the behavioral rule
where
a ∈ A and b ∈ A \ {a}. In order to provide a specific example, consider a model of complete information adaptive learning with X = [0, 1], where if the current probabilities of choosing actions are described by σ ∈ ∆(A), then the probability of choosing action a ∈ A in the following period is described as
with β(·, ·, ·, ·, ·) ∈ [0, 1] and p > 0, for all a ∈ A, x ∈ X |A| , f ∈ F t−1 , σ ∈ ∆(A), and t ∈ N.
We now provide sufficient conditions for a behavioral rule of this type to yield WBERHR for two optimality criteria.
Lemma 2. Consider two cases:
1. Let A * be defined as in (12) and assume that g b,a,t (x 1 , x 2 , f, σ) = c b,a,t (x 2 − x 1 ) for some scalar c b,a,t ≥ 0, for all t ∈ N, f ∈ F t−1 , σ ∈ ∆(A), a ∈ A, b ∈ A \ {a}, and x 1 , x 2 ∈ X .
Define
where U denotes the set of all bounded, non-decreasing functions u : X → R. 13 Suppose that, given the information up to time t, x t+1 (a) and x t+1 (b) are pair-wise independent for all a, b ∈ A, and
Then, in any of the two cases, the system (Π, A), defined by (7), (13), and (14), satisfies WBERHR, with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 , where
13 In other words, here we define A * as the set of actions whose payoff distribution at time t, given the information up to time t − 1, first-order stochastically dominates the payoff distribution at time t, given the information up to time t − 1, of all other actions, for all t ∈ N. We remind the reader that a random variable X with cumulative distribution function FX first-order stochastically dominates a random variable Y with cumulative distribution function
Proof. In the first case, we clearly have that δ t ≥ 0. In the second case, fix a ∈ A * , b ∈ A \ {a}, t ∈ N 0 , f ∈ F, σ ∈ S, and the symmetric-switch function g(·, ·) ≡ g b,a,t+1 (·, ·, f, σ). By the rule of iterated expectations we obtain that
where σ(x t+1 (b)) is the σ-algebra generated by x t+1 (b) and x t+1 (b) is an independent copy of x t+1 (b).
The inequality follows from the fact that g is non-decreasing in the second component and that x t+1 (a) strictly first-order stochastically dominates x t+1 (b). The last equality follows from the anti-symmetry property of g. This yields δ t ≥ 0.
We proceed by observing that E t [g(x t+1 (b), x t+1 (a))] = 0 if b ∈ A * in both cases since then x t+1 (a) and x t+1 (b) have either the same expectation (in the first case) or have the same distribution (in the second case). We then utilize (7), (13), and (14) to obtain
for all f ∈ F, σ ∈ S, and t ∈ N 0 , which yields the statement.
Lemma 2 establishes that the system induced by the updating rule defined by (14) and the aggregator defined with respect to expected payoff maximizing or first-order stochastically dominant actions satisfies WBERHR. For applications, Lemma 3 in Oyarzun and Ruf (2009) proves to be helpful in the second case when the set of optimal actions is specified in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance. That lemma states, for fixed a, b ∈ A and t ∈ N 0 , that the strict inequality E t [g(x t+1 (b), x t+1 (a))] > 0 holds if g is symmetric-switch and additionally g(x 1 , x 2 ) > 0 for all x 1 , x 2 ∈ X with x 2 > x 1 , provided that x t+1 (a) first-order stochastically dominates x t+1 (b) and their distributions are different.
Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 then yield the following corollary:
Corollary 3. With the notation and assumptions of Lemma 2 the following holds:
1. Suppose that ∞ t=0 δ 2 t = ∞ and P 0 > 0. Then, for all ǫ > 0, there exists a slowing sequence θ = {θ t } t∈N 0 such that P(P θ ∞ = 1) > 1 − ǫ. Here P θ is the performance measure of the system defined by (7), (13), and (14), with symmetric-switch functions g θ b,a,t (·, ·, f, σ) :
,t for all a, b ∈ A, t ∈ N, f ∈ F and σ ∈ S, in (14).
2. Suppose that P 0 > 0 and, for sake of simple notation, assume that X = [0, 1]. Then, for any c ∈ (0, 1], the behavioral rule in (15) with β(t, ·, ·, ·, ·) = c/(t + 1) for all t ∈ N and, in the first case of Lemma 2, with p = 1, and in the second case, with arbitrary p > 0, satisfies P(P ∞ = 1) = 1, provided that
In particular, if we assume that P 0 > 0 and that the payoffs are independent and identically distributed over time, that is, (x t (c)) c∈A and (xt(c)) c∈A are independent and identically distributed for all t ∈ N and t ∈ N \ {t}, then the behavioral rule in (15) with p = 1 yields optimality with very high probability if β(·, ·, ·, ·, ·) is constant and sufficiently small, or almost surely if β(t, ·, ·, ·, ·) = 1/(t + 1) for all t ∈ N.
There are well known learning procedures with full information about payoffs that converge to choosing expected payoff maximizing actions. One of such procedures is provided by Rustichini (1999) ; it relates to the Roth and Erev (1995) model of individual learning that we describe below. Another such procedure is fictitious play (see, e.g., Fudenberg and Levine (1998) ). In contrast to the model outlined above, neither Rustichini's model of learning with full information, nor fictitious play, satisfy that the probability of choosing optimal actions is a submartingale. Hence, these models cannot satisfy BERHR or WBERHR.
Roth-Erev learning model
In the previous subsections we have used Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to provide sufficient conditions for achieving optimality either with high probability or almost surely. In this subsection, we show that the almost-sure optimality of Roth and Erev's behavioral rule can be derived from the slowing-down argument developed in Theorem 2. This learning rule has been widely used to describe learning in experimental economics (see, e.g., Roth and Erev (1995) ) and its convergence properties have been studied in several places in the literature (see Beggs (2005) and Hopkins and Posch (2005) , and the references therein).
Roth and Erev's behavioral rule can be associated to an information space F = F t = R |A| ++ for all t ∈ N 0 . An element in this set is typically interpreted as a vector of current "attractions" corresponding to each action, and the probability of choosing each of them is proportional to its attraction. The updating rule
, is given by Π F t (f, σ) = f + a∈A 1 {at=a} x t (a)e a for all t ∈ N, f ∈ F, and σ ∈ S, where e a is a unit vector in R |A| with a 1 in the a th position and zeros elsewhere. This means that only the attraction of the chosen action is updated, and it is increased in an amount equal to the obtained payoff. Let V t := a∈A f a,t for all t ∈ N 0 denote the sum of attractions at time t ∈ N 0 .
The updating rule of Roth and Erev is defined by the time-invariant behavioral rule
c∈A f c + x for all a ∈ A, b ∈ A \ {a}, x ∈ X , and f ∈ F. The updating rule of this model is thus defined by
for all t ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω t , f ∈ F t−1 and σ ∈ S. We shall assume that the set of payoffs X = [x min , x max ] satisfies x min ≥ 0. The set of optimal actions we consider here is the set of expected payoff maximizing actions A * defined in (12). Beggs (2005) provides a thorough analysis of the Roth and Erev (1995) model of individual learning with partial information. Here we recover and slightly generalize his convergence result 14 using a different argument and hence, provide a different interpretation of the convergence properties of this learning model. The proof we provide here follows from Theorem 2 and can be found in Appendix B. Hence, our argument is based on the analysis of the properties of the expected relative hazard rates of this learning model.
Corollary 4. Suppose that there exists an almost surely strictly positive random variable ǫ with
If an individual makes choices according to Roth-Erev's behavioral rule, then P ∞ = 1 almost surely; that is, the individual will play, in the limit, almost surely an optimal action.
We remark that, apart from (17), we have made no assumptions on either stationarity or independence of the actions' payoffs. Finally, we also remark that although we have explicitly specified the system defined by this learning model, our convergence result is based on Theorem 2, so the proof of Corollary 4 is only based on the analysis of the performance measure.
Social learning
In this subsection, we allow individuals to observe other individuals' choices and obtained payoffs. This may result in individuals imitating the individuals they observe, thus allowing learning by imitation.
We formally describe imitation using a behavioral rule {L (i) t } t∈N that we decompose in two behavioral components. The first of them, which we call the imitation component, corresponds to how the information in the current sample of observed choices and payoffs affects the individual's behavior. In particular, this component represents individuals' drive to imitate what others do. The second component of behavior corresponds to the probabilities of choosing each action in the previous period. These probabilities only reflect past information the individual has observed and hence may be interpreted as a purely inertial behavioral component.
We assume that at time t = 1, each individual i ∈ W chooses each action with exogenously given probabilities σ (i) 0 ∈ ∆(A). In the following periods individuals are allowed to imitate other individuals. We assume that at time t + 1 individuals make choices through imitation with probability λ t−1 ∈ [0, 1], for all t ∈ N or, otherwise, they choose each action with the same probability as in the last period.
14 E.g., Beggs (2005) shows his result under the additional assumption that xmin > 0.
We call λ := {λ t } t∈N 0 the imitation rate and we assume λ t is F [0,t] -measurable and is the same for all individuals. The behavioral rule's imitation component describes the probability of imitating each of the other individuals (or simply repeating her own choice in the previous period). These probabilities are determined as a function of the new information the individual receives about the chosen actions and obtained payoffs in the population.
In particular, individuals have a common information updating rule such that F (i) 0 is an arbitrary singleton, and
for all i ∈ W and t ∈ N, where k W i is the set of all subsets of W that contain individual i and k − 1 other individuals, for k ∈ {1, ..., |W |}. Thus, our model allows an individual to observe any number of individuals in the population, the actions they chose, and the payoff they obtained. The set of all possible "aggregated" information accumulated up to time t ∈ N 0 is given by F t = × i∈W F (i) t and the information updating rule is assumed to be
for all t ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω t , f ∈ F t−1 , and σ ∈ S. Thus, the information updating rule reflects all the information revealed to each individual up to each point in time.
In order to define the updating rule of this model, we begin by specifying the imitation component
for all i ∈ W and t ∈ N. Therefore, O
t represents all the possible new information individual i may receive at time t, along with her previous information state and current probabilities of choosing each action. The imitation component maps the observation in the information set O (i) t to the probability of imitating any of the observed individuals at each time t, and therefore, L
t and t ∈ N. We now can specify the updating rule of this model at each time t ∈ N as a collection of individual behavioral rules:
for all t ∈ N, ω ∈ Ω t , f ∈ F t−1 , and σ ∈ S.
The probability that i ∈ W chooses an optimal action at time t + 1, given the information up to t,
and an individual who chose a non-optimal action is more likely to imitate an individual who chose an optimal action than vice versa, whenever both of them observe the same sample.
Lemma 3. Define the random variables
for all t ∈ N 0 . Suppose that s
t+1 is conditionally independent, given the information up to time t, of {x
t+1 } i∈W for all j ∈ W and t ∈ N 0 . 15 Suppose, furthermore, that sampling is symmetric and observable (with lower bound ξ > 0) and L satisfies the must-see condition.
Provided that δ t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N 0 , the system (Π, A), defined by (7), (18), and (19), then satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 given by δ t = λ t (|W | − 1)ξ δ t for all t ∈ N 0 .
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix B.
We, therefore, can provide a bound in the expected change in the fraction of the population who chooses an optimal action in terms of the imitating probabilities among individuals. The expected net switch of probabilities of choosing each action is determined both by the information that becomes available to individuals and how their behavioral rules transform it in updated probabilities.
, and x (s) ∈ X |s| ; we assume, for sake of simple notation only,
In order to guarantee that δ t ≥ 0 in Lemma 3 is satisfied, we impose further restrictions on how the imitation components respond to payoffs. The following lemma provides a set of conditions.
Lemma 4. Suppose that the distribution of x (i)
1. Let A * be defined as in (12) and assume that g t,i,j,s (x (s\{i,j}) , ·) is symmetric-switch, and linear and non-decreasing in x j for all t ∈ N, i ∈ W , j ∈ W \ {i}, s ∈S(i, j), and x (s) ∈ X |s| .
2. Let A * be defined as in (16), and assume that g t,i,j,s (x (s\{i,j}) , ·) is symmetric-switch for all t ∈ N, i ∈ W , j ∈ W \ {i}, and s ∈S(i, j). Moreover, suppose that, given the information up to time t,
t+1 } i∈W are independent for all t ∈ N 0 . Alternatively, suppose that g t,i,j,s can be written as a sum of functions that only depend on pairs of payoffs (x (i) , x (j) ) i,j∈s for all x (s) ∈ X |s| , in which case we only require pairwise independence of {x
Then, in any of the two cases, we have δ t ≥ 0 for all t ∈ N 0 forδ t defined in (20).
Proof. The first case is clear. Now fix t ∈ N, i ∈ W , j ∈ W \ {i} and s ∈S(i, j) and consider the second case. First, condition on x (s\{i,j}) t+1
and then proceed as in the proof of Lemma 2 to obtain the statement.
Under the alternative assumption directly use the ideas of the proof of Lemma 2.
This result reveals that symmetric and observable sampling yield that obtaining positive relative hazard rates depends on the behavioral rules, the payoff distributions and the criterion to define the performance measure. Here, we considered expected payoff and first-order stochastic dominance, but other criteria are possible. We remind the reader of Subsection 4.1.2's discussion of Lemma 3 in Oyarzun and Ruf (2009) that yields sufficient conditions for the strict inequality δ t > 0.
An example of a behavioral rule that satisfies either condition in Lemma 4 is given by
t−1 , and σ (i) ∈ ∆(A). Another example that satisfies Condition 2 in Lemma 4 and does not impose linearity of the behavioral component on the observed payoff of the sampled individuals is given by
k∈s f x (k) with
t−1 , and σ (i) ∈ ∆(A), where f : X → [0, ∞) is any non-negative and non-decreasing function; e.g., f (x) = x. The specification of such an imitation component resembles that of the Roth-Erev model of individual learning. In that model, the probability of choosing each action is proportional to the cumulative reinforcement, determined by the payoffs the individual has received over time with each action. Here, the probability of imitating each other sampled individual is proportional to the payoff that such an individual received and hence, the probability of choosing the corresponding action through imitation is proportional to the sum of payoffs it provided to the sampled individuals who have chosen this action.
We now can apply Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 to provide sufficient conditions to achieve optimality with high probability or almost surely:
Corollary 5. With the notation and assumptions of Lemmas 3 and 4 the following holds:
1. Suppose that ∞ t=0 δ 2 t = ∞ and P 0 > 0. Then, for all ǫ > 0, there exists a slowing sequence θ = {θ t } t∈N 0 (constant if inf t∈N 0 δ t ≥δ a.s. for some constantδ > 0) such that P(P θ ∞ = 1) > 1 − ǫ. Here, P θ is the performance measure of a system defined by (7), (18), and (19) with λ t replaced by θ t λ t for all t ∈ N 0 .
2. Suppose that P 0 > 0 and
for either f (x) = x or any nonnegative, non-decreasing and bounded function f on X . Then, with λ t = 1/(t + 2) for all t ∈ N 0 , the performance measure P of the system (Π, A) defined by (7), (18), (19), and (21) or (22) satisfies P(P ∞ = 1) = 1.
The condition in (23) is satisfied if the payoffs are independent and identically distributed over time, either trivially if f (x) = x, or due to Lemma 3 in Oyarzun and Ruf (2009) if f is additionally assumed to be strictly increasing, similarly as in Subsection 4.1.2.
When we impose that each individual only observes one other individual, i.e., j∈W \{i} ρ (i) t ({i, j}) = 1 for all i ∈ W , the imitation component of the behavioral rules in this section correspond to the first-order monotone behavioral rules in Oyarzun and Ruf (2009) . When we further assume that the symmetricswitch functions are linear, the class of imitation components of the behavioral rules contains Schlag (1998) improving behavioral rules. When we impose that each individual observes two other individuals, i.e., j∈W \{i},k∈W \{i,j} ρ (i) t ({i, j, k}) = 1 for all i ∈ W , and the symmetric-switching functions are linear, the imitation component satisfies the characterization of strictly improving rules in Schlag (1999) . We are not aware of any paper in the literature that provides implications for the relative hazard rates for the other possibilities of sampling that we allow.
In contrast with previous convergence results that rely on populations that are a continuum, our analysis reveals that behavioral rules with an improving imitation component, as described in Corollary 5, yield optimality almost surely even for finite populations. As the second part of this result reveals, adding the extra assumption that the weight of the imitation component of behavior decreases linearly over time is enough to obtain optimality almost surely.
Discussion
Our analysis of systems that satisfy WBERHR or BERHR can be the starting point for the study of slightly more complex dynamics. There are many other models in the literature with similar characteristics to those considered here that do not satisfy these properties. One example is the model of word-ofmouth social learning in Ellison and Fudenberg (1995) . In their model, individuals sample n ∈ N other individuals out of a continuum population and choose the action that has the highest average payoff in their observed sample. Aggregate shocks (on top of individual specific shocks) of the payoffs yielded by the two available actions allow for randomness despite of the population's cardinality. For n = 1, their model satisfies BERHR, and hence, their findings are recovered by our results. In particular, the population may "herd" to the action with the lowest expected payoff with positive probability, and this probability goes to zero when there is enough inertia (which is equivalent to slowing down in our analysis). For n > 2, however, their model does not satisfy WBERHR and thus our results tell us nothing about the asymptotic properties of their model. Future research could study related conditions on these systems that make it possible to analyze the asymptotic properties of the models in a general framework encompassing their findings for these cases.
Another possible extension is the study of properties of systems that satisfy (W)BERHR in games. Beggs (2005) shows that the Roth-Erev learning model leads individuals to converge to play with zeroprobability actions eliminated by iterated deletion of dominated strategies. It does not seem that our analysis could be extended in a straightforward manner to this context. This is a topic that deserves further attention in the future.
The trade-off between speed and the probability of achieving optimality is of particular interest in the literature of learning automata (see, e.g., Narendra and Thathachar (1989) ) and hence, worth of further study. An approach is provided by the classic analysis of multi-armed bandits (see, e.g., Rothschild (1974) ). Since in that analysis (intertemporal) preferences are exogenously given and intertemporal discounting is assumed to be geometric, this provides only a particular manner of dealing with this trade-off.
In our analysis of the properties of the dynamics of choices in social learning models, our sampling assumptions may seem restrictive in some setups. For instance, observability may rule out network structures in which individuals may sample some other individuals in the network with zero probability (see, e.g., Bala and Goyal (1998) ). It is intuitive, however, that the choices of individuals who are not sampled may be observed, after a number of periods, provided that there is a path of individuals connecting the individual who chose one action and another who chooses that action later via imitation. Analyzing the dynamics of the optimality measure in such structures would require developing further the constructions we have provided above. We leave this for future research.
A Proofs of the convergence results in Section 3
In this appendix, we provide the proofs for the statements of Section 3. We start with some auxiliary lemmas.
Lemma 5. If the system (Π, A) satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ, then Π θ , A satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence {θ t δ t } t∈N 0 .
Proof. From the definition of the WBERHR property and the linearity of A, we obtain
for all f ∈ F t , σ ∈ S and t ∈ N 0 . Lemma 6. If the system (Π, A) satisfies WBERHR with lower bound sequence δ = {δ t } t∈N 0 and if ∞ t=0 δ t = ∞, then P ∞ ∈ {0, 1} for all f 0 ∈ F 0 and σ 0 ∈ S.
Proof. Assume that P t does not almost surely converge to either 0 or 1. Then, there exists an ǫ > 0 such that P(lim t↑∞ P t (1 − P t ) > 2ǫ) > 2ǫ. Thus, there exists a t 0 ∈ N such that the event B := {P t (1 − P t ) > ǫ for all t ≥ t 0 } satisfies P(B) > ǫ.
By the hypothesis,
as t tends to infinity, leading to a contradiction.
Lemma 7. If the system (Π, A) satisfies (1) for some f ∈ F t , σ ∈ S, t ∈ N 0 , and
Proof. We only need to show the statement for γ > 0. Thus, we assume, without loss of generality, to be in the event {δ t > 0}. We define the function
and observe that
we see that
for all z ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ (0, 1], which yields that
where the first inequality comes using (24) with z = A(Π t+1 (f, σ)) and the second inequality from using
(1). This yields
which proves the statement. Now, we provide the proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. (of Theorem 1). Fix the smallest integer γ = γ(P 0 , ǫ) such that e − γP 0 < ε. We define the slowing sequence θ by θ t := (δ t ∧ 1)/ γ ≤ 1 and observe that ∞ t=0 θ t δ t = ∞. As η t is allowed to be one, it is sufficient to show the rest of the statement for the slowing sequence ηθ for some sequence η as in the statement. Towards this end, define the process M = {M t } t∈N 0 as M t := e − γP ηθ t for all t ∈ N 0 .
We start by observing that M is a supermartingale since, for fixed t ∈ N 0 , we have that and we obtain
where we have used Lemmas 5 and 6 in the first equality. This yields the statement.
The proof of Theorem 2 is similar:
Proof. (of Theorem 2). Fix ǫ ∈ (0, 1) and observe that there exists a constant δ ∈ (0, 1) such that the event A := { δ ≥ δ} ⊂ {min t∈N 0 {δ t /θ t } ≥ δ} satisfies P(A) ≥ 1 − ǫ/2. Define y := − log(ǫ/2)/δ > 0 and the process M = {M t } t∈N 0 as
Pt 1 {min u∈{0,...,t} {δu/θu}≥δ} for all t ∈ N 0 , where the stopping time ρ is given in (6). As in the proof of Theorem 1 we start by showing that M is a supermartingale. Towards this end, fix some t ∈ N 0 and assume, without loss of generality, that we are on the event {min u∈{0,...,t} {δ u /θ u } ≥ δ}. Define now P t = P t and P t+1 = P t + (P t+1 − P t )/θ t ∈ [0, 1] and observe that P t+1 − P t ≥ δ P t (1 − P t ). We then obtain that where we have used Lemma 7, in which we interpret (P t , P t+1 ) as the "slowed down version" of ( P t , P t+1 ).
Thus, as in the proof of Theorem 1, M t converges to some random variable M ∞ ∈ [0, 1].
As ρ < ∞ almost surely by assumption, we obtain from a similar argument as in Lemma 6 that
similarly to the proof of Theorem 1, where A C := Ω \ A. As ǫ was chosen arbitrarily, we obtain the statement.
The next lemmas are useful in the proof of Corollary 1:
Lemma 8. For a system (Π, A) with corresponding performance sequence {P t } t∈N 0 , we have P θ t ≥ P 0 /(t+ 1) for all t ∈ N 0 for the slowing sequence θ defined by θ t = 1/(t + 2).
Proof. Assume that we have shown P θ t ≥ P 0 /(t + 1) for some fixed t ∈ N 0 . Then 
Then P(ρ < ∞) = 1.
Proof. We shall show the statement with y in (25) replaced by N P 0 , where N = [y/P 0 ] + 1 with [·] here denoting the largest integer smaller than the argument. Define N k := N 2k − 1 for all k ∈ N 0 . Since P(ρ > t) is non-increasing in t, it is sufficient to show that P(ρ > N k ) → 0 as k → ∞. This follows if there exists some constant c ∈ [0, 1) independent of k such that
for all k ∈ N. Towards this end, Lemma 8 and the submartingality of {P t } t∈N 0 yield
since P θ t+1 ≤ P θ t + θ t and p 0 ≥ p 1 . Sorting terms, this yields
and, thus, (26).
B Proofs of the results in Section 4
The following simple observation, which is closely related to Lemma 2 in Beggs (2005) , will be useful in the proof of Corollary 4:
Lemma 10. If, in the setup of Subsection 4.1.3, for some a ∈ A, we have E t [x t+1 (a)] > ǫ almost surely for all t ∈ N 0 , for some almost surely strictly positive random variable ǫ, then lim t↑∞ f a,t = ∞.
Proof. We observe that the probability of choosing action a at time t is bounded from below by f a,0 /(V 0 + (t − 1)x max ). Thus, an application of the Borel-Cantelli lemma yields that action a is chosen infinitely often, say at times τ 1 < τ 2 < . . .; set τ 0 := 0. Consider now the martingale M = {M n } n∈N 0 with
as n ↑ ∞ due to the Strong Law of Large Numbers for martingales in Chow (1967) applied to the first term and using the Martingale Convergence Theorem and Cesàro mean for the second term. This directly yields the statement.
We now provide the proof of Corollary 4:
Proof. (of Corollary 4). We assume, without loss of generality by Lemma 10, that
We observe that with σ(a) := f a / c∈A f c for all a ∈ A, b ∈ A \ {a}, x ∈ X , and f ∈ F. Therefore, with the obvious definition for σ t , we obtain that for all t ∈ N 0 . We notice that
> 0 for all t ∈ N 0 , a ∈ A * , and b ∈ A \ A * due to (27). This inequality yields also ∞ t=0 δ t = ∞. We set θ t := x max /V t ∈ (0, 1) for all t ∈ N 0 and observe that
>δ for some strictly positive random variableδ. Furthermore, −P t x max V t ≤ P t V t V t + x max − P t ≤ P t+1 − P t ≤ P t V t + x t+1 (a t+1 ) V t + x t+1 (a t+1 ) − P t = x t+1 (a t+1 )(1 − P t ) V t + x t+1 (a t+1 ) ≤ x max V t (1 − P t ) for all i ∈ W and j ∈ W \ {i}. This yields that 
where the first inequality follows from the assumed observability and the second inequality from the fact that i∈W (P (i) t ) 2 ≥ |W |P 2 t , which is implied by Jensen's inequality. The statement then follows directly.
